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A Substitution Box (S-Box) is an integral component of modern block ciphers that
provides confusion. The term ”confusion” was introduced by Shannon in 1949 and it refers
to the complexity of the relationship between the key and the ciphertext. Most S-Boxes
are non-linear in order to promote confusion. Due to this, the S-Box is usually the most
complex component of a block cipher. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) features
an 8-bit S-Box where the output depends on the Galois field multiplicative inverse of the
input.
MK-3 is a sponge based Authenticated Encryption (AE) algorithm which provides
both authenticity and confidentiality. It was developed through a joint effort between the
Rochester Institute of Technology and the former Harris Corporation, now L3Harris. The
MK-3 algorithm has a state that is 512 bits wide and it uses 32 instances of a 16-bit S-Box
to cover the entire state. These 16-bit S-Boxes are similar to what is seen in the AES,
however, they are notably larger and more complex.
Binary Galois field arithmetic is well suited to hardware implementations where addi-
tion and multiplication are mapped to a combination of basic XOR and AND operations.
A simple method to calculate Galois field multiplicative inversion is through the extended
Euclidean algorithm. This is, however, very expensive to implement in hardware. A pos-
sible solution is to use a composite field representation, where the original operation is
broken down to a series of simpler operations in the base field. This lends itself very well
to implementations that consume less area and power with better performance.
Given the size and number of the S-Boxes in MK-3, these units contribute to the ma-
jority of the implementation resources. Several composite field structures are explored in
this work which provide different area utilization and clock frequency characteristics. This
thesis evaluates the composite field structures and recommends several candidates for high
performing MK-3 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) applications.
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The vast majority of research on hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms
uses Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) as the platform. There is a good rea-
son for this; by implementing the algorithm on an ASIC, the designer has control of the
implementation down to the logic gate or even the transistors if necessary. Each logical
operation of the design is synthesized into a set of logic gates on an ASIC. This allows
the researchers to get the most efficient designs and also provides an easy way to com-
pare against others just by the gate count. Comparison on an equivalent design on a Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is more difficult since the atomic computation unit is
a Look Up Table (LUT). Where one operation on an ASIC would be mapped to a series
of logic gates, one or more operations in an FPGA can be mapped to a single LUT. This
obfuscates the impact of each optimization.
However, there are occasions where an FPGA is desired for the implementation. An
FPGA is reconfigurable; the design can be changed at a moment’s notice. Whereas an
implementation on an ASIC has one predetermined purpose, it cannot change. Likewise,
the development time is shorter on an FPGA and does not require as large of an investment
to get started.
1.2 Overview of Symmetric Key Cryptography
Symmetric key cryptography involves three components: the unencrypted message (plain-
text), the key for the encryption, and the encrypted message (ciphertext). The classic ex-
ample shown in Fig. 1.1 features Alice sending a message to Bob over an insecure channel.
Since the contents of messages can be observed through the insecure channel, Alice en-
crypts the plaintext with the key in order to produce a ciphertext. While it may be observed
while in transit, without the key, the ciphertext will not involve any details of the plaintext.
When Bob receives the cipher text, he uses the same key to decrypt it as Alice used to
encrypt it.
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Figure 1.1: Symmetric key cryptography
1.2.1 Confusion and Diffusion
At the core of any cryptography algorithm are the properties confusion and diffusion. They
come from Shannon’s Communication theory of secrecy systems [1].
Diffusion is a linear transformation spread across the entire state. The purpose of it is
to hide the relationship between the ciphertext and plaintext. If a single bit of plaintext
changes, statistically half of the ciphertext should change.
Confusion is a non-linear transformation of small pieces of data. The purpose of it is
to hide the relationship between the ciphertext and the key. In other words, each bit of the
ciphertext should depend on multiple bits of the key.
1.2.2 Block and Stream Ciphers
There are two types of ciphers. The first type, a block cipher, encrypts fixed-sized blocks
of plaintext symbols into ciphertext [2].
A stream cipher operates by encrypting one symbol of plaintext into ciphertext at a time.
This is accomplished by adding a symbol from a key stream onto the plaintext symbol [2].
Compared to a stream cipher, a block cipher has higher diffusion since one symbol of
plaintext is diffused across the entire block of ciphertext. However, it may be slower than
a stream cipher since an entire block of plaintext must be accumulated before it can be
encrypted.
1.2.3 Substitution Box
A Substitution Box (S-Box) is a component seen in many encryption algorithms and is
often the main source of non-linear confusion. An S-box simply works by mapping an
3
input vector of length l to an output vector of length m [3]. The length of the input and the
output do not have to be equal. S-Boxes are often implemented as tables.
Perhaps the most famous one is the S-Box seen in the Advanced Encryption standard
(AES) [4]. The AES S-Box features Galois Field multiplicative inversion followed by an
affine transformation.
The Advanced Encryption Standard was announced by the US National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) on Nov. 26 2001 [5]. NIST selected the candidate
Rijndael designed by Vincent Rijmen and Joan Daemen out of 15 others to become the
standard after a 5 year long selection process. It features a block size of 128 bits and three
different key sizes: 128, 192, and 256 bits.
There has been a large amount of research focused on efficiently implementing the
AES S-Box on hardware. Before AES and the candidate Rijndael became the symmetric
key encryption standard, Paar [6] used tower composite fields for efficient Galois field
arithmetic in 1994. Later, when AES became the standard, Satoh et al [7] in 2001 used
tower composite fields to implement the AES S-Box. The change of basis matrices were
further optimized by Canright between 2004 and 2005 [8, 9]. Later on in 2013, Wood
provided further logic optimizations to the change of basis matrix and the composite fields
[10].
1.2.4 Authenticated Encryption
The flaw to symmetric key cryptography used on it’s own is that there is no guarantee
regarding the authenticity of the message. In Fig. 1.2, Bob has no way of knowing if the
received message truly arrived from Alice or if Oscar intercepted it and modified it.
To combat this, Message Authentication Code (MAC) can be embedded inside of the
ciphertext. The MAC is a product of the key and either the plaintext or the ciphertext [3].
By doing so, any modification by Oscar to the ciphertext will produce a different MAC
since he does not have the key. When Bob receives the message and checks the MAC, Bob
will be aware that the authenticity of the message can be compromised.
1.3 Contribution
The main contribution of this thesis is an investigation into the area and performance trade
offs of design choices on the S-Box of the Authenticated Encryption algorithm MK-3. The
S-Box featured inside of MK-3 is 16-bits wide which is twice the width of most other S-
Boxes used in cryptography. Due to the size of this, it stands to benefit from a hardware
design intended for an FPGA implementation. This work found two candidates: one that
has an optimal clock frequency of 125 MHz and another with the smallest area of 271 Look
Up Tables. Both of these exceed the frequency of the ASIC optimized implementation
4
Figure 1.2: The need for authenticated encryption
chosen by Wood [10] and implemented on an FPGA by Werner [11]. The latter one also
improves upon the area utilization. The list of specific contributions are listed below:
• Analysis of the effect of a normal and polynomial basis extension on the MK-3 S-Box
• Analysis of the effect of the base field used for the composite MK-3 S-Box
• Analysis of the effect of a hierarchical or flattened implementation of the sub field
operations
• Consolidated overview of composite Galois field arithmetic pertaining to MK-3 S-
Boxes
• Python scripts for finding optimal composite candidates
• Python scripts for generating composite, Galois field inversion and multiplication
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 3 provides a background on Galois field
arithmetic that is the basis for the substitution box studied in this thesis. Next, Chapter
2 introduces the Authenticated Encryption Algorithm MK-3. Chapter 4 discusses how
MK-3 can be implemented on an FPGA. The scripting infrastructure used to find optimal
implementation candidates and generate the RTL is shown in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analyzes
the results of the FPGA implementations. Finally, a conclusion is offered in Chapter 7 as




MK-3 is an authenticated encryption algorithm developed through a joint effort between
the Rochester Institute of Technology and the former Harris Corporation, now known as
L3Harris [12, 13, 14, 15].
This AE cipher uses a duplex sponge to simultaneously absorb input and squeeze output
shown in Figure 2.1.This is a modification to the original sponge that allows the algorithm
to both absorb input and squeeze output simultaneously [12]. The MK-3 core is largely
composed of binary XOR, AND, and shift operations which yields itself very well to hard-
ware implementations [11].
Figure 2.1: MK-3 duplex construction utilizing the MK-3 bijective function (F) [12]
The bijective function (F) shown in Figure 2.2 used in MK-3 is composed of 4 stages:
Substitution (S), Bit Permutation (π), Mixing (M), and Round Key (
⊕
). The bijective
function operations across 512 bits as a whole.
Substitution Operates across 32 groups of 16 bits. Galois field multiplicative inver-
sion is performed on each 16 bit group.
Permutation Spans the full 512 bits, the position of each bit is swapped.
Mixing Operates across 16 groups of 32 bits. Galois field multiplication is per-
formed between the left and right halves of each group.
Round Key A round key is XORed to create the output of the function.
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Figure 2.2: MK-3 bijective function [16]
The substitution stage in the MK-3 bijective function show as ’S’ in Fig 2.2 performs
Galois field multiplicative inversion followed by an affine transformation. There are 32
S-boxes which each operate on 16-bits of the state at a time. The multiplicative inversion
is non-linear and is the primary source of confusion in the algorithm. The Galois field
featured in MK-3 is from Christopher Wood’s thesis [10]. It was chosen due to it’s efficient
hardware implementation on ASICs, requiring only 1238 XOR gates and 144 AND gates
[10]. The irreducible polynomial, p(x) is
p(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x+ 1
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The forward S-Box function is given as
S(x) =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0












































0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1






















The second stage of the MK-3 bijective function is the permutation, shown as ’π’ in Fig
8
2.2. It reorders the state according to the function
y = 31x+ 15 mod (512)
This is the primary source of diffusion as it shuffles the bit order across the entire state. The
output of each S-box will be even spread across every mixer in the following stage.
The mixers are in the third stage, shown as ’M’ in Fig 2.2. They are responsible for short


















Since the only multiplication in the mixing stage is by x, the entire operation only requires
shifting the coefficients and binary XORs for hardware implementations.
The final stage is the round key, shown as
⊕
in Fig 2.2. A 512 bit round key constant
is added to the state to inject asymmetry. The round key is different for each round. The




A field F = (F,+, ·, 0, 1) is an algebra on a set of elements F , where addition (+) and
multiplication (·) with neutral elements 0 and 1, and domains F and F \ {0}, respectively,
are groups . The elements must also be mutually exclusive (0 6= 1). Inside the field F, the
addition and multiplication operations satisfy the following [17]:
Identity: For all a in F
a+ 0 = a and a · 1 = a
Commutativity: For all a, b in F, a+ b = b+ a and a · b = b · a
Associativity: For all a, b, c in F,
a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c
a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c
Distributivity: For all a, b, c in F,
a · (b+ c) = a · b+ a · c
(b+ c) · a = b · a+ c · a
Inverses: For all a in F, −a exists and a+ (−a) = 0
For all nonzero a in F, a−1 exists and a · a−1 = 1
The classical examples of fields are real numbers, complex numbers, or rational num-
bers, with the standard operations +, ·. These are the typically mentioned fields with an
infinite number of elements. The remainder of this thesis will only use finite fields. One
of the most remarkable results in abstract algebra is that the structure and properties of all
finite fields can be summarized in an elegant and compact way, and then used in effective
ways in many areas of computing. This is what finite Galois fields are, as described in the
following sections.
3.1 Finite Galois Fields
Theorem: For every prime number p and positive integer m, there exists a finite field with
pm elements for every isomorphism, denoted GF (pm). Furthermore no other finite fields
exist [17].
10
Form = 1 the above reduces prime order Galois fields, which in this case are essentially
equivalent to modular arithmetic modulo p. In cryptography, telecommunication, and other
computing applications the most common case is that of so called binary fields, where
p = 2. The remainder of this document will only deal with binary Galois fields, i.e. with
GF (2m). From this perspective, GF (2m) will be considered degree m extension of the
binary GF (2) field. However, if m = st is composite, then it can be seen that GF (2st) =
GF ((2s)t) as degree t extension of the base field GF (2s). These two perspectives lead
to isomorphic (logically equivalent) representations of the same field, but as will be seen
in detail in the following, the algorithms implementing basic arithmetic operations within
them have quite different characteristics.
The two most common ways to represent the fieldsGF (2m), and design and implement
algorithms operating within them, are by using polynomial bases or by using normal bases.
These are summarized in the following.
Consider any polynomial P (x) of degree m over the field F2 = GF (2) of the form
P (x) = amx
m + am−1x
m−1 + ·+ a1x+ a0, (3.1)
where ai ∈ F2, and x is a formal variable. The set of such polynomials is denoted by
F2[x]. The polynomial P (x) ∈ F2[x] is called an irreducible over F2 if and only if it
cannot be factored into two polynomials in F2[x] both of degree less than m. If P (x) is
irreducible then it can play a role similar to prime numbers in integer modular arithmetic.
Remainders of the division of any polynomial in F2[x] by P (x) are considered, which must
be polynomials of degree at most m − 1. The set of polynomials in F2[x] taken modulo
P (x), together with arithmetic defined on them, is isomorphic to the unique Galois field
GF (2m). These remarks make a foundation of the most common representation ofGF (2m)
in polynomial bases. If in addition some algebraical properties of special elements of the
field are a starting point, then a representation of GF (2m) in the normal bases can be built.
The details of both are presented in the next subsections.
The following sections incorporate the notation Pm andNm to describeGF (2m) fields
using polynomial and normal basis representations respectively.
3.2 Polynomial Basis for Binary Galois Fields
In the basic field F2 addition is the same as the standard XOR operation and multiplication
is a binary AND. Both operations equivalently can be seen as as addition and multiplication
modulo 2.
F2 can be extended to GF (2m) by using polynomials in F2[x], taken modulo a degree
m irreducible polynomial P (x). This means that each element ofGF (2m) is represented as
a polynomial in F2[x] of degree less than m. Suppose there are two such polynomials A(x)




m−1 + ...+ a1x+ a0,
B(x) = bm−1x
m−1 + ...+ b1x+ b0,
S(x) = A(x) +B(x)
= (am−1 + bm−1)x
m−1 + ...+ (a1 + b1)x+ (a0 + b0)
(3.2)






i+j mod P (x) (3.3)
Addition simply involves adding the corresponding coefficients modulo 2 to obtain
the sum. Multiplication requires reduction modulo P (x) after the standard summation
expressions. Note that in the special case shown below whenB(x) = x, which is important
in some applications:
C(x) = A(x)× x mod P (x)
= (am−1x




m−1 + ...+ a1x
2 + a0x, if am−1 = 0,
(xm + P (x)) + am−2x
m−1 + ...+ a1x
2 + a0x, if am−1 = 1.
(3.4)
Observe that since P (x) is a polynomial of degree m, then its highest term cancels with the
term xm, and thus the sum xm + P (x) is a polynomial of degree at most m− 1.
3.3 Normal Basis for Binary Galois Fields
The element Y of the field GF (2m) is called normal if and only if the set
B = {Y, Y 2, Y 22 , · · · , Y 2m−1}
is linearly independent. In other words, for the polynomial
A(Y ) = am−1Y
2m−1 + am−2Y
2m−2 + ...+ a1Y
2 + a0Y
it holds that A(Y ) = 0 if and only if ai = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < m. If B is linearly independent,
then it can be used as a basis in which every element α ∈ GF (2m) is uniquely represented
by the vector (am−1, · · · , a0) so that A(Y ) = α. This is called normal basis representation
of the field. Every nonzero element α, and in particular every normal element Y , must have
12
Y 010 011 100 101 110 111
Y 2 100 101 110 111 010 011
Y 4 110 111 010 011 100 101
normal X X X
Table 3.1: Verification of the candidates for normal elements.
the order (the smallest k > 0 for which αk = 1) which is a divisor of 2m − 1. Thus
Y Y 2Y 2
2 · · ·Y 2m−1 = 1.
Next, observe that each next element of the basis B is the square of the previous one
(Y 2
i
)2 = Y 2
i+1 , with wrapping at the lowest power Y = (Y 2m−1)2.
Ex 3.3.1. Consider GF (23) using the irreducible polynomial x3 + x+ 1. There are only 6
normal element candidates since 0 and 1 are ineligible: x, x + 1, x2, x2 + 1, x2 + x, and
x2 + x+1. The coefficients of the set B are shown in Table 3.1 for each of the candidates.
In order to be a normal element, the set B must be linearly independent. This disquali-
fies x, x2, and x2 + x. The remaining three candidates for normal elements actually lead to
the same elements in B, only a different order. In this case, using x + 1 for Y , the normal
basis can be constructed as shown below
Y = x+ 1
Y 2 = x2 + 1
Y 4 = x2 + x+ 1
which in matrix form is
1 1 01 0 1
1 1 1
 . (3.5)
These equations and the matrix can be inverted to
1 = Y 4 + Y 2 + Y
x = Y 4 + Y 2
x2 = Y 4 + Y
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and
1 1 10 1 1
1 0 1
 (3.6)
Addition using normal basis B is essentially the same as polynomial basis addition.
Here, it involves coordinate-wise addition (in F2, which is the same as XOR) of vectors
(am−1, · · · , a0) and (bm−1, · · · , b0), which represent α = A(Y ) and β = B(Y ) in the
normal basis B:
A(Y ) = am−1Y
2m−1 + ...+ a1Y
2 + a0Y
B(Y ) = bm−1Y
2m−1 + ...+ b1Y
2 + b0Y
S(Y ) = A(Y ) +B(Y ) = α + β = (sm−1, · · · , s1, s0)
S(Y ) = (am−1 + bm−1)Y
2m−1 + ...+ (a1 + b1)Y
2 + (a0 + b0)Y
(3.7)
For multiplication, by elementary algebra, the product γ = C(Y ) = A(Y )×B(Y ) can








The next step is to represent the result of the last expression when evaluated in GF (2m)
using the normal basis B. For this, the terms Y 2i+2j need to be expressed in basis B, then
just use normal basis addition as above.
Ex 3.3.2. Using GF (24) represented by an irreducible polynomial P (x) = x4 + x+ 1 and
a normal element Y = x3. Next, the elements of the normal basis, Y 2i are expressed using
polynomial arithmetic modulo P (x):
Y 8 = x3 + x
Y 4 = x3 + x2 + x+ 1
Y 2 = x3 + x2
Y = x3
(3.8)
The cumulative effect of equations (3.8) can be expressed by a matrix M , which pro-




1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0
 (3.9)
The matrix M can be inverted to:
M−1 =

0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
 (3.10)
x3 = Y
x2 = Y 2 + Y
x = Y 8 + Y
1 = Y 8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y
(3.11)
which can be used to express polynomial basis elements using normal basis. Note that all
powers Y k can be represented this way. For example, for k = 3
Y 3 = Y 2 × Y = (x3 + x2)x3 = x6 + x5 = x3 + x mod P (x).
The normal representation of all Y k terms can be found by converting the polynomial
representation to the normal basis using the entries shown in Table 3.2. Observe that the
sequence Y, Y 2, Y 8, Y 4, Y 8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y repeats across the powers of Y .
Next, going back to the multiplication problem, (3.9) can be used to express the result
in normal basis. The actual multiplication of two polynomials




B(Y ) = b3Y
8 + b2Y
4 + b1Y
2 + b0Y, gives


























Y 2 x3 + x2 Y 2
Y 3 x3 + x Y 8
Y 4 x3 + x2 + x+ 1 Y 4
Y 5 1 Y 8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y
Y 6 x3 Y
Y 7 x3 + x2 Y 2
Y 8 x3 + x Y 8
Y 9 x3 + x2 + x+ 1 Y 4
Y 10 1 Y 8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y
Y 11 x3 Y
Y 12 x3 + x2 Y 2
Y 13 x3 + x Y 8
Y 14 x3 + x2 + x+ 1 Y 4
Y 15 1 Y 8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y
Table 3.2: Powers of normal element Y represented in polynomial and normal bases.
the reduction can be performed using Table 3.2, which expresses each of the terms Y k as
a combination of normal basis elements Y 2i . Recall that Y 2m = Y , which means that
exponents of Y can be reduced modulo 2m − 1 (in this example, modulo 15). Thus, C(Y )
can be further rewritten as follows
C(Y ) =a3b3Y + a3b2Y
2 + a3b1(Y




8 + a2b1Y + a2b0(Y
8 + Y 4 + Y 2 + Y )+
a1b3(Y









and reorganized according to powers of Y as
C(Y ) =(a0b1 + a0b2 + a1b0 + a1b3 + a2b0 + a2b2 + a3b1)Y
8
(a0b2 + a0b3 + a1b1 + a1b3 + a2b0 + a3b0 + a3b1)Y
4
(a0b0 + a0b2 + a1b3 + a2b0 + a2b3 + a3b1 + a3b2)Y
2
(a0b2 + a1b2 + a1b3 + a2b0 + a2b1 + a3b1 + a3b3)Y.
(3.14)
In general, the conversion between normal and polynomial basis representations oc-
curs through a linear isomorphism defined by matrix M , as shown in examples (3.9) and
(3.10). The elements of M are from the base field, which so far was binary F2 = GF (2),
though this will be generalized toGF (2s) here and in the next section, where the composite
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representations of binary Galois fields are discussed.
An important property of normal basis representation (in the basic case F2, s = 1, but




power n = 2s (which is squaring in the basic case n = 2, and raising to powers of the form
2s in general) can be reduced to a circular left shift. Observe that the scalar coefficients ai
of A(Y ) are in GF (n) = GF (2s), and thus they satisfy the Fermat-type property ani = ai
and the parity cancellation rule ai + ai = 0. Note also that mixed power terms in the
expansion of A(Y )n will vanish because of the latter. This gives:
A(Y )n = anm−1Y
nm + anm−2Y
nm−1 + ...+ an1Y
n2 + an0Y
n
= am−1Y + am−2Y









The Galois fields of the form GF (pm), where p is a prime and m = st is a composite num-
ber, can be represented by a special two-stage extension process. First, the field GF (ps) is
built on an irreducible polynomial of degree s over GF (p), then it is extended to GF (pm)
by using degree-t extension of GF (ps). For this second step an irreducible polynomial of
degree t overGF (ps) is needed. Such constructions are leading to what is called composite
field representations. Ifm has k > 2 factors, then it can be represented by the finalGF (pm)
using k consecutive extensions starting from the base field GF (p).
By theorem 1 in section 3.1, if the number of elements in the field is fixed, then all
constructions must lead to the same field up to isomorphism. This is what is exploited in
this section: for fixed pm, computations in GF (pm) performed in different constructions
of the field, yet under properly defined isomorphisms they must describe the same com-
putations. This is utilized to find more efficient ways to evaluate the standard operators in
GF (pm). An isomorphism between the two fields can be used to interchange between the
two. Arithmetic performed in the standard polynomial representation of the field is equiv-
alent to converting to the composite field, performing the operation in it, and converting
back.
Ex 3.4.1. For a standard field GF (24) with R(z) = z4 + z + 1 and a composite field
GF ((22)2) with Q(x) = x2 + x+ 1 and P (y) = 01y2 + 01y + 10. The isomorphism c can
be 01y + 10.
17
R(c) = (01y + 10)4 + (01y + 10) + 01
= (01y2 + 100)2 + 01y + 11
The 100 term is outside of the bounds of Q(x), it can be reduced by XORing with the
irreducible, yielding x+ 1 or 11.
= (01y2 + 11)2 + 01y + 11
The y2 term also needs to be reduced by XORing with P (y) to yield 01y + 10.
= ((01y + 10) + 11)2 + 01y + 11
= (01y + 01)2 + 01y + 11
= 01y2 + 01 + 01y + 11
= (01y + 10) + 01y + 10
= 0
Therefore, c = 01y+10 is a valid isomorphism between the two representations. Next, the
powers of c are computed as below and placed into a the matrix in 3.16.
c0 = 00y + 01
c1 = 01y + 10
c2 = 01y + 01
c3 = 10y + 00
M1 =

1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
 (3.16)
This M1 contains the corresponding composite term of each individual scalar coeffi-




1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
 (3.17)
As a test of M1 and M−11 , z of P4 can be converted to P2P2
M1z =

1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0













 = 01y + 10
squared,
(01y + 10)2 = 01y2 + 10y + 10y + 100 = (01y + 10) + 11 = 01y + 01









1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0














3.5 Mixing Bases in a Composite Field
The above example was exclusively in the polynomial basis. The conversion matrix in
(3.17) can be combined with a normal basis transformation so that the composite represen-
tation uses the normal basis.
Ex 3.5.1. Using the same fields as in the previous example, a normal element ofGF ((22)2),
Y = 01y + 01 can be used to transform the extension field to the normal basis, P2N2.
Y 1 = 01y + 01
Y 2 = 01y + 11
Y 4 = 01y + 00
Since Y belongs to GF ((22)2), the conversion matrix M2 will be a 2 × 2 matrix con-








The inverse of M2, used to convert back to the polynomial composite representation
happens to be equal to M2.
As a test 01y + 10 can be converted to P2N2,













= 114 + 10Y
squared,
(114 + 10Y )2 = 101Y 8 + 110Y 5 + 110Y 5 + 100Y 2
= 10Y 8 + 11Y 2 = 01(11Y 4 + 10Y ) + 11(10Y 4 + 11Y )
= 110Y 4 + 100Y + 110Y 4 + 101Y = 10Y 4 + 11Y + 01Y 4 + 10Y
= 01Y



















= 01y + 01
The composite representation of an element in the normal extension field now uses the
form
δ1Y
4 + δ0Y (3.19)
where δ ∈ GF (22) This can be can be reconfigured using γ ∈ GF (2) such that
=(γ3x+ γ2)Y
4 + (γ1x+ γ0)Y
=γ3xY
4 + γ2Y
4 + γ1xY + γ0Y
=γ3(10Y
4) + γ2(01Y
4) + γ1(10Y ) + γ0(01Y ) (3.20)
The Y terms can then be transformed using M−12 so that the outer field uses the polynomial
basis. Now that the representation uses the polynomial basis for both fields, it can be
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brought back to the original GF (24) representation by applying M−11 .
10Y 4 =10y + 00 = z3
01Y 4 =01y + 00 = z2 + 1
10Y =10y + 10 = z3 + z2 + z + 1
01Y =01y + 01 = z2
(3.21)
Replacing the Y terms in (3.20) with (3.21) yields
γ3(z
3) + γ2(z
2 + 1) + γ1(z
3 + z2 + z + 1) + γ0(z
2) (3.22)
M−13 can be constructed using (3.22) to transform from the mixed basis composite form
back to the polynomial basis GF (24) form.
M−13 =

1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0


















1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0















As a test of M3 and M−13 , z of P4 can be converted to P2N2
M3z =

1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0













 = 11Y 4 + 10
squared,
(11Y 4 + 10Y )2 = 01Y









1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0














Ex 3.5.2. For a standard field GF (28) with R(z) = z8 + z4 + z3 + z + 1 and a composite
field GF ((24)2) with Q(x) = x4 + x+ 1 and P (y) = 0001y2 + 0001y + 1000 a combined
set of change of basis matrices can be constructed to go directly from P8 to P4N2. The
isomorphism c = 0010y + 0000 and norm Y = 0001y + 0000 will be used.
M1 can be constructed with c and will convert from P8 to P4P2
M1 =

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0




Inverting M1 will yield the transformation back to P8.
M−11 =

1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

(3.28)
As a test of M1 and M−11 , z of P8 can be converted to P4P2
M1z =

1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0























= 0010y + 0000
squared,
(0010y + 0000)2 = 0100y2 = 0100(y + 1000) = 0100y + 0110














1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

























Y and Y 16 are used to construct M2 and M−12 which will provide the conversion be-
tween P4P2 and P4N2.
Y =0001y + 0000
Y 2 =0001y + 1000
Y 4 =0001y + 0100
Y 8 =0001y + 1011
Y 16 =0001y + 0001














As a test, 0010y + 0000 can be converted to P4N2,













= 0000Y 16 + 0010Y
squared,
(0010Y )2 = 0100Y 2 = 0100(1000Y 16 + 1001Y )
= 0110Y 16 + 0010Y



















= 0100y + 0110
Using the same procedure as the previous example, M−13 can be constructed by con-
verting each P4N2 coefficient to P4P2 and then to P8.
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0000Y 16 + 0001Y = 0001y + 0000 = z7 + z5 + z
0000Y 16 + 0010Y = 0010y + 0000 = z
0000Y 16 + 0100Y = 0100y + 0000 = z7 + z5 + z4 + z3
0000Y 16 + 1000Y = 1000y + 0000 = z7 + z6 + z4 + z3 + z + 1
0001Y 16 + 0000Y = 0001y + 0001 = z7 + z5 + z + 1
0010Y 16 + 0000Y = 0010y + 0010 = z6 + z4 + z3 + z2 + z
0100Y 16 + 0000Y = 0100y + 0100 = z6 + z4 + z3
1000Y 16 + 0000Y = 1000y + 1000 = z7 + z3 + z + 1
Assembling the above results into a matrix yields the transformation from P4N2 to P8.
M−13 =

1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0

(3.31)
By inverting M−13 the transformation from P8 to P4N2 can be found.
M3 =

0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0




As a test of M3 and M−13 , z of P8 can be converted to P4N2
M3z =

0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0























= 0000Y 16 + 0010Y
squared,
(0010Y )2 = 0110Y 16 + 0010Y














1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
























3.6 Composite Field Hardware Derivation
The composite fields used in this thesis feature extensions of degree 2. The irreducible
polynomials used will follow the form shown in (3.33) where there is a trace component τ
and a norm component ν.
Q(y) = y2 + τy + ν (3.33)
The derivation of the composite field operations in the following sections was derived
from [8, 10]. The term ε will be used for the top field and δ will be used for the base field.
3.6.1 Polynomial Basis Multiplication
Given two elements ε1 and ε2, the multiplication begins by first separating the components
into their composite representations and distributing them.
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ε3 = ε1 × ε2
δ5x+ δ6 = (δ1x+ δ1)(δ3x+ δ4)
= δ1δ3x
2 + δ1δ4x+ δ2δ3x+ δ2δ4
The x2 term can be reduced by XORing with the irreducible P (x).
= δ1δ3(x+ ν) + δ1δ4x+ δ2δ3x+ δ2δ4
= (δ1δ3 + δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)x+ (δ1δ3ν + δ2δ4)
This can then be rewritten by using the relation (δ1+ δ2)(δ3+ δ4) = δ1δ3+ δ1δ4+ δ2δ3+ δ4
on the x coefficients.
= (δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4))x+ (δ1δ3ν + δ2δ4)
Therefore, δ5 and δ6 can be solved for in order to obtain ε3
δ5 = δ2δ4 + (δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4) (3.34)
δ6 = δ1δ3ν + δ2δ4 (3.35)








Figure 3.1: Polynomial basis composite field multiplication
3.6.2 Polynomial Basis Inversion
For the inversion derivation, the start is similar with the exception that ε3 is known to be
equal to 1 and the goal is to solve for ε2 which is ε−11 in terms of ε1.
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1 = ε1 × ε2
= (δ1x+ δ2)(δ3x+ δ4)
= δ1δ3x
2 + δ1δ4x+ δ2δ3x+ δ3δ4
(3.36)
In order for the inverse to exist, the right side of the equation must follow the form k ×
P (x) + 1 = k(x2 + x + ν) + 1 = 1. Knowing this, the terms of the right side can be
separated such that
k = δ1δ3 (3.37)
k = (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3) (3.38)
kν + 1 = δ2δ4 (3.39)
By substituting 3.37 into 3.39
δ2δ4 = νδ1δ3 + 1 (3.40)
And setting 3.37 equal to 3.38
δ1δ3 = (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)
δ1δ3 + δ2δ3 = δ1δ4
δ3(δ1δ2) = δ1δ4
δ3 = δ1δ4(δ1 + δ2)
−1 (3.41)
δ3 has been solved for, but it still contains a δ4 component that will need to be removed. δ4
can be solved for by substituting 3.41 into 3.40.
δ2δ4 = νδ1(δ1δ4(δ1 + δ2)
−1) + 1
δ2δ4(δ1 + δ2) = νδ1 + (δ1 + δ2)
δ2δ4 + δ1δ2δ4 + δ
2
1νδ4 = (δ1 + δ2)
δ4(δ
2
2 + δ1δ2 + δ
2
1ν) = (δ1 + δ2)
δ4 = (δ1 + δ2)(δ
2




This can then be substituted into 3.40 to obtain δ3 in terms of δ1 and δ2 only.
δ3 = δ1(δ1 + δ2)(δ
2












Therefore, the inverse of ε1 has been solved for.
ε1 = δ3x+ δ4
δ3 = δ1(δ
2




δ4 = (δ1 + δ2)(δ
2










Figure 3.2: Polynomial basis composite field inversion
3.6.3 Polynomial Basis Square Scaling
The P4P2P2 and P4P2N2 inversion circuits perform P4P2 square-scaling inside. The scal-











































1δ4ν + δ2δ4) (3.44)
Since the scalar (δ3x + δ4) is known, the composite operations can be reduced if the
scalar has certain properties. The first optimization that can be made is if δ4 is equal to 0.
This will allow for several terms to be removed.








The composite hardware can be further reduced if δ3 is the inverse of nu. By doing so,
several multiplications will cancel out.
= (δ21ν




This leaves two square-scaling operations, one squaring, and two additions.
3.6.4 Normal Basis Multiplication
If the irreducible polynomial Q(y) was to have roots, they would be Y and Y q. If the two
roots are distributed, the irreducible can be rewritten as (3.47).
Q(y) = y2 + τy + ν
= (y + Y q)(y + Y )
= y2 + (Y q + Y )y + Y Y q (3.47)
Upon comparison of eqs. (3.33) and (3.47), it can be said that the trace component τ is
the sum of the two roots and the norm component ν is the product.
τ = (Y q + Y ) (3.48)
ν = Y Y q (3.49)
1 = (Y q + Y )τ−1 (3.50)
The trace and norm components belong to the sub field GF (2s) however Y and Y q
belong to the field formed by GF ((2s)t). Since Y q = Y 2s the leading coefficient of Y and
Y q will be equal. Therefore the leading coefficients in Y Y q and Y + Y q cancel each other
out and equal zero. The norm and trace components can be expressed inside of the sub
field.
The multiplication of ε1 by ε2 to obtain ε3 begins by first separating the components
into their composite representation and distributing the terms.
ε3 = ε1 × ε2
(δ5Y
q + δ6Y ) = (δ1Y
x + δ2Y )(δ3Y
q + δ4Y )
= δ1δ3(Y
q)2 + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)Y
qY + δ2δ4Y
2
The distribution has produced the terms (Y q)2, and Y 2 which are outside of the normal
basis representation. These can be rewritten so that they exist in the normal basis using the
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following derived from eqs. (3.48) and (3.49).
(Y q)2 = Y qτ + ν (3.51)
Y 2 = Y τ + ν (3.52)
Y qY = ν (3.53)
(δ5Y
q + δ6Y )
= δ1δ3(Y
qτ + ν) + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)ν + δ2δ4(Y τ + ν)
= δ1δ3τY
q + δ2δ4τY + (δ1δ3ν + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ4)ν + δ2δ4ν)
= δ1δ3τY
q + δ2δ4τY + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1(Y q + Y )
= (δ1δ3τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1)Y q




δ5 = δ1δ3τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1 (3.55)
δ6 = δ2δ4τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1 (3.56)
Equations (3.55) and (3.56) provide δ5 and δ6. One optimization to this is to remove the
multiplication involving the trace component (τ). Since τ = Y q + Y , the norm Y can be
selected such that the trace is equal to 1. By doing so, the multiplications by the trace have
no effect on δ5 and δ6. Figure 3.3 shows the block diagram of the multiplier.
δ5 = δ1δ3 + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν] (3.57)
δ6 = δ2δ4 + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν] (3.58)
3.6.5 Normal Basis Inversion
Composite field inversion begins much in the same way as the multiplication with the
exception that only ε1 is known and the goal is to obtain ε2 such that it is the inverse ε1.
1 = ε1 × ε2
= (δ1Y
q + δ2Y )(δ3Y
x + δ4Y )
= δ1δ3(Y
q)2 + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)Y
xY + δ2δ4Y
2









Figure 3.3: Normal basis composite field multiplication
1 = δ1δ3(Y
qτ + ν) + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)ν + δ2δ4(Y τ + ν)
= δ1δ3τY
x + δ2δ4τY + (δ1δ3ν + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ4)ν + δ2δ4ν)
= δ1δ3τY
q + δ2δ4τY + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1(Y q + Y )
= (δ1δ3τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1)Y x
+ (δ2δ4τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1)Y
(3.59)
However, now that the coefficients are separated into Y and Y q components, the deriva-
tion can proceed further than the multiplication. Using (3.50), it is known that both the Y
and Y q coefficients must both be equal to τ−1. Therefore both terms can now be separately
evaluated.
τ−1 = δ1δ3τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1 (3.60)
τ−1 = δ2δ4τ + [(δ1 + δ2)(δ3 + δ4)ν]τ
−1 (3.61)
Since both equations are equal to τ−1, they can be added together to arrive at (3.63).
0 = δ1δ3τ + δ2δ4τ (3.62)
∴ δ1δ3 = δ2δ4 (3.63)
Using (3.60), the τ−1 can be removed by multiplying by τ .
1 = δ1δ3τ
2 + (δ1δ4 + δ2δ3)ν
δ2 = δ1δ2δ3τ




The δ1δ2δ4 term can then be replaced with δ21δ3 using (3.63), therefore
δ2 = δ1δ2δ3τ




2 + (δ21 + δ
2
2)ν]δ3 (3.65)
Now, the only unknown variable in the equation is δ3. It can now be solved for; the same
process applies to (3.61) in order to obtain δ4.
δ3 = δ2[δ1δ2τ













that the same components can be used in hardware besides the multiplication with δ2 and
δ1, respectively. Furthermore, the trace can again be set to 1 as shown in the multiplication
derivation. Figure 3.4, shows the block diagram for the composite field inversion using the
normal basis.






















The majority of the complexity in MK-3 is the Substitution stage which is the focus of this
thesis. If left alone, The GF (216) multiplicative inversion will require a table with 65,536
16-bit elements. The Galois field can be represented compositely in order to break down the
inversion into a sequence of smaller operations that are more efficient when implemented
in hardware.
Figure 4.1: Composite Tower Field Representations
Fig 4.1 shows the possible composite representations of a 16-bit irreducible polynomial.
Prior work by Wood [10] implemented the GF (216) inversion used in MK-3 compositely
using GF ((((22)2)2)2) representations. Later on, this was adapted by Werner for an FPGA
[11] which also used towers of binary extensions. This thesis expands upon this by exam-
ining GF (((24)2)2) and GF ((28)2) composite representations for an FPGA.
4.1 FPGA Architecture
The atomic computation unit of an FPGA is a Look-Up-Table (LUT). As shown in Fig
4.2, a LUT typically has 4-6 inputs which index a table containing the output bit for every
combination of inputs. The LUTs inside of an FPGA are of a fixed size; using a portion of
the inputs for computation will leave some of the LUT utilized.
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The target FPGA for this thesis is a Xilinx Kintex 7 (xc7k160tfbg676-1) which features
logic slices containing 4 6-input LUTs. The LUTs feature two outputs, O5 and O6 [18].
When all 6 inputs are used in a LUT, only O6 is used. When 5 or fewer inputs are used,
both O5 and O6 can be used.
Figure 4.2: A single LUT
The LUTs inside of an FPGA are arranged into units called logic slices. Logic slices
mainly contain LUTs, multiplexers, and registers. The LUTs and a multiplexer inside of
a logic slice are often configured to function as a single, larger LUT. Fig 4.3 shows 4 6-
input LUTs feeding into two stages of multiplexers that uses the last two bits of the input
to function as a single 8-input LUT.
Figure 4.3: Four 6-input LUTs configured to function as an 8-input LUT
The logic slices inside of the Xilinx Kintex 7 Feature two multiplexer stages: F7 and
F8 [18]. The F7 stage has two multiplexers, each one takes the output of two LUTs and
selects between them using one more input bit. This allows each F7 Mux to function as a 7
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bit LUT. The F8 Mux operates in the same fashion, but combines the output of the two F7
MUXs to function as 8 inputs.
4.2 Implementation Candidates




the GF ((((22)2)2)2) option is well suited to ASICs where optimizations can remove indi-
vidual logic gates. Both Canright and Wood used towers of binary extension fields over
GF (22) for their AES and MK-3 implementations [8, 10]. GF (22) operations use at most
4 inputs during multiplication of two elements. Addition, squaring, and scaling all need
at most 2 inputs. If the same designs are placed on an FPGA, this will leave the some of
the LUTs inside of a design underutilized. Instead, the S-box can be altered to use GF (24)
or a GF (28) as the base of the composite representation. This will help the design better
fit the LUTs inside of an FPGA and may result in a better area efficiency and clock fre-
quency. This thesis seeks to investigate the trade offs between area and frequency of the
three candidates on an FPGA.
In addition to the base field of the composite representation, the basis of the outer
extension field will be implemented using the normal and polynomial basis in an effort to
understand the effect on the FGPA design.
MK-3 features four stages: Substitution, Permutation, Mixing, and the Round Key.
Since the permutation stage mixes the bits across the entire state, it is not feasible to remain
in the composite representation for the duration of the encryption. Therefore the composite
representation will only be used inside of the Substitution stage. Change of basis matrices
will be on the input and output of the composite inversion in order to translate into and out
of the composite representation. It will resemble Figure 4.4.
4.2.1 P8P2 and P8N2 Inversion
GF ((28)2) inversion breaks the inversion into a sequence of polynomial basis GF (28)
operations (P8). The addition being a binary XOR will easily fit inside of a single LUT.
Inversion and square-scaling operate on one P8 element and produce a P8 result. Since
each output bit depends on all 8 input bits, this can fit into 4 LUTs and a MUX as in Fig.
4.3. P8 multiplication requires two P8 inputs to produce one P8 result. This will not easily
synthesize onto an FPGA.
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Figure 4.4: MK-3 Composite S-Box
To get around this, a second basis transformation can be used to perform the multi-
plication compositely using a P4P2 representation. Besides P4 multiplication, all other
operations only need one LUT per output bit to compute the result. As in the case of P8
inversion and square-scaling, P4 multiplication will require 8 input bits to output 1 output
bit (2 4-bit inputs) and will fit inside of 4 LUTs and a MUX as shown in Fig. 4.3.
4.2.2 P4P2P2 and P4P2N2 Inversion
P4P2P2 and P4P2N2 inversion circuits each contain the following P4P2 operations: ad-
dition, multiplication, inversion, and square-scaling. Addition is always an XOR between
the two inputs and is simple. The multiplication of P4P2 elements is best implemented
by a composite set of P4 operations. Since the composite square-scaling and inversion
operations only have one P4P2 input, it can either be implemented through a series of hi-
erarchical composite operations as in Sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.2 or through a flattened LUT
containing all 256 possible P4P2 results.
The LUT or ’flattened’ approach is a fixed cost for both inversion and square-scaling. 4
LUTs and the multiplexers in a logic slice will function as a single 8-input LUT inside of a
logic slice as in Figure 4.3. This means that the P4P2 operation will require 8 logic slices,
consisting of 32 LUTs, 16 F7 MUXs, and 8 F8 MUXs in total.
If implemented hierarchically, LUTs will be used for each logical operation. The sub
field operations for P4P2 inversion and square-scaling are shown in Table 4.1.
Operation Addition Mult. Inversion Squaring Sq-Scaling
Inversion 2 3 1 0 1
Sq-Scaling 2 0 0 1 2
Table 4.1: Sub field operations inside of a composite operation





(3.46). The LUT cost for hierarchical P4P2 composite square-scaling is as follows:
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Square-Scaling and Square Operations
• δ21ν
−1 and δ21 share the same input, δ1. Due to this, they can share the same dual
output LUT. 4 LUTs will be needed.
• δ22ν
−1 does not share any common inputs and it will need it’s own LUTs. There-
fore, 4 LUTs will be necessary.
Addition There are two additions in the square-scale circuit. Since they sum together the
square-scale and square operations, they can both be combined into one addition of
3 inputs. With 4 output bits, 4 LUTs are required in total.
In total, this requires 12 LUTs.
Unlike the P4P2 square-scaling, the implementation of the P4P2 inversion does not
feature any functions that share common inputs. The LUT cost for hierarchical inversion is
as follows:
Addition and Square-Scaling Each of these operations require 4 input functions. They
do not share any common inputs. As such, 1 LUT per output bit will be required,
with 2 additions, 1 square-scale, and 1 inversion, that is 16 LUTs total.
Multiplication Multiplication of two 4-bit inputs will require 4 LUTs per output bit. There
are 3 multipliers in the circuit, which together, require 48 LUTs.
In total, this requires 64 LUTs.
The P4P2P2 and P4P2P2 inversion circuits will require one P4P2 inversion and one
P4P2 square-scaling. Therefore, a hierarchical implementation of both operations will re-
quire 76 LUTs compared to 64 LUTs using the flattened implementation. The flattened
implementation will also have a latency advantage since each output bit can be computed
inside of a single logic slice. However, the hierarchical implementation may provide more
opportunity for the synthesis tool to optimize the design. Due to this, both design choices
will be implemented.
This leaves three main variables controlling the S-Box implementation: the base field,





The composite S-Box implementations of MK-3 were generated through a series of Python
scripts. Wood [19] wrote a Python library for performing Galois field arithmetic. This
library has been extended in this thesis to handle multiple levels of extension fields. The
Python scripts provide two functions: finding optimal field candidates and generating the
RTL for the composite multiplicative inverse module.
5.1 Finding Optimal Field Candidates
The Python code to find all of the composite field candidates for MK-3 was divided into
three main scripts
1. Finding all possible composite representations and isomorphisms
2. Finding all normal elements in each composite representation
3. Finding optimal candidates
5.1.1 General Construction
The Python scripts written to find all suitable composite field representations of MK-3
feature several places where parallelism can be exposed. The Multiprocessing package
was chosen to handle running all of the concurrent blocks. It uses process-based parallelism
instead of thread-based parallelism which allows it to run across multiple CPU cores. This
enables it to work in the Research Computing environment [20] available at RIT where
jobs are scheduled through SLURM.
The Multiprocessing package [21] arranges the available CPUs into a ’pool.’ Once jobs
are assigned to the pool, the pool will allocate available CPUs to the jobs until all of the jobs
have completed. The jobs are simply Python function calls. The Multiprocessing package
also includes a Queue class that can handle asynchronous communication from the parallel
jobs; this was used to return job results through so that they may be processed while the
rest of the jobs are executing.
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Results from the scripts were saved to simple plain text output files. Galois field ele-
ments were written to the file by printing out the coefficients of the field encased in square
brackets ([]). A rudimentary regex parser was built to read back the Galois field elements
in the output files and rebuild the components for the later scripts. If this was to be done
again, a YAML file or the pickle package in Python would be better solutions.
The file structure was organized as follows
Directory Description
core Contains core classes for arithmetic and general utilities
gen hdl Classes responsible for generating VHDL components of MK-3
output Generated output files for composite field candidates
output hdl Generated VHDL source code
. Main scripts
5.1.2 Finding Isomorphisms
The first script is responsible for finding all of the possible composite fields and the isomor-
phisms that link it to the MK-3 polynomial. In order to simplify the isomorphism search,
constraints were placed on the composite fields that were used. Binary extension fields
of the form y2 + y + λ were used. In addition the base field was chosen to be the AES
polynomial, x8 + x4 + x3 + x + 1 for GF ((28)2) and x4 + x + 1 for GF (((24)2)2). The
AES polynomial was chosen since it has already undergone rigorous research as part of
becoming a standard of encryption; x4 + x + 1 was chosen since it is one of only two
choices.
The next step in the script is to eliminate composite field candidates that are not irre-
ducible. Since the extension fields used in this thesis are binary, the roots can be found by
solving
y2 + y = λ (5.1)
All possible values of y can be evaluated in (5.1). The values of λ that equal y2 + y can be
eliminated. Those that remain form an irreducible composite representation.
Now that all of the suitable composite fields are known, all that remains is to find the
isomorphisms to the MK-3 polynomial. For each composite field F , every possible value is
substituted into the MK-3 polynomial. Those that equal 0 form an isomorphism. This step
lends itself very well to parallelism, it needs to be evaluated for every field and for every
possible value in the field.
Listing 5.1: Snippet searching for the isomorphisms in GF ((28)2)
1 f o r j in range ( 1 , 2 * * 8 ) :
2 x v a l = GFElem ( b i t f i e l d ( j ) )
3 f o r k in range ( 0 , 2 * * 8 ) :
4 o n e v a l = GFElem ( b i t f i e l d ( k ) )
5 v a l = GFExtensionElem ( [ x v a l , o n e v a l ] )
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7 # Check f o r i somorph i sm
8 # r e s s h o u l d be 0 i f t h a t i s t h e case
9 r e s = F . g add ( F . g add ( F . g add ( F . g add ( f a s t e x p g f ( F , va l , 16) ,
10 f a s t e x p g f ( F , va l , 5 ) ) , f a s t e x p g f ( F , va l , 3 ) ) , v a l ) , GFExtensionElem ( [
↪→ GFElem ( [ 1 ] ) ] ) )
For each isomorphism found, both the isomorphism and the associated field are printed
out to an output file. This will be used in the following steps. There are four different
implementations of this script. There is a single-threaded version primarily for debugging
and a version using the Multiprocessing module for both the GF (((24)2)2) and GF ((28)2)
implementations.
5.1.3 Finding Normal Elements
For an element inside of a composite field to be normal, it must be linearly independent.
The scripts to find the normal elements are responsible for evaluating every element inside
each composite field candidate. This is easily parallelizeable across each composite field.
A function was written, find norms, that evaluates every element in a composite field and
returns the list of elements that are normal.
Listing 5.2: Snippet finding all normal elements inside of a composite field
1 # F u n c t i o n t o f i n d a normal e l e m e n t i n s i d e a f i e l d
2 # A c c e p t s e i t h e r a GF or GFExtens ion f i e l d
3 # R e t u r n s a l i s t o f normal e l e m e n t s
4 def f i n d n o r m s ( F ) :
5 norms = [ ]
6 m = l e n ( F . i p ) − 1
7 mat = [ ]
8
9 i f F . c l a s s == GF :
10 p = F . base
11 # E x h a u s t i v e l y s e a r c h f o r a normal e l e m e n t
12 f o r i in range ( 2 , 2**m) :
13 mat = [ ]
14 elem = GFElem ( b i t f i e l d ( i , p ) )
15 f o r i in range (m) :
16 mat . append ( gfElem2Ls t ( F , elem ) )
17 elem = F . power ( elem , p )
18 i f i s l i n e a r i n d ( p , mat ) :
19 norms . append ( elem )
20 e l i f F . c l a s s == GFExtens ion :
21 c o e f f C o u n t = g e t c o e f f C o u n t ( F )
22 p = g e t b a s e F i e l d P r i m ( F )
23 n = g e t c o e f f C o u n t ( F . b a s e F i e l d )
24
25 f o r i in range ( 1 , p** c o e f f C o u n t ) :
26 mat = [ ]
27
28 # C re a t e one l a r g e GFExtens ion e l e m e n t
29 elem = c r e a t e E l e m ( F , b i t f i e l d ( i , p , c o e f f C o u n t ) )
30 f o r j in range ( F . e x t e n s i o n ) :
31 row = F . power ( elem , ( p**n ) ** j )
32 mat . append ( gfElem2Ls t ( F , row , f l a t t e n = F a l s e ) )
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33 i f i s l i n e a r i n d ( F . b a s e F i e l d , mat ) :
34 norms . append ( elem )
35 re turn norms
The script begins by reading in the list of composite fields produced by the function. A
function call to find norms for each composite field is submitted to the pool of parallel tasks
to be run. Upon completion, all of the normal elements and their corresponding composite
field are written to a second output file for further processing in the next step.
5.1.4 Optimization
The main choices that affect the size of the multiplicative inverse circuit is the composite
field type (GF ((28)2) or GF (((24)2)2)), the basis (normal or polynomial), the coefficients
of the field, and for P4P2X2 fields, the implementation of single input P4P2 operations
(square-scaling and inversion). The type of the field will determine the overall construction
of the circuit. Both the type and the coefficients together determine the change of basis
matrices on either end of the circuit that are responsible for converting to and from the
GF (216) representation used in the rest of the the MK-3 algorithm.
In order to determine the impact that the basis and type of composite field have on
the circuit, a separate script was written for each combination: GF ((28)2) polynomial and
normal; GF (((24)2)2)) polynomial and normal. The scripts use the list of composite field
candidates and isomorphims to construct the change of basis matrices. For the normal ba-
sis versions, the script also reads in the list of normal basis elements for each composite
field and constructs the matrices for each normal element. For P4P2P2 and P4P2N2 im-
plementations that feature a hierarchical P4P2 inversion and square-scaling, the candidates
that do not meet the criteria for the scaling component are filtered out. The change of basis
matrices are then ranked according to the number of LUTs needed.
The construction of the change of basis matrices occurs in two steps where the second
step is only used for the normal basis composite fields. The first step, shown in Listing
5.3 simply involves constructing a change of basis matrix to the polynomial, composite
representation. This is accomplished using the provided isomorphism self.c and composite
field self.F.
Listing 5.3: GFCompFieldBasis class definition and genChangeBasisMat member function
constructing a polynomial basis composite field
1 # C l a s s t o c o n t a i n c , F , and bo th change o f b a s i s m a t r i c e s
2 c l a s s GFCompFieldBasis ( o b j e c t ) :
3 def i n i t ( s e l f , c , F ) :
4 s e l f . c = c
5 s e l f . F = F
6 s e l f . p = g e t b a s e F i e l d P r i m ( F )
7 s e l f . b a s i s = None
8 s e l f . i n v b a s i s = None
9 s e l f . d i r e c t c o u n t = None
10 s e l f . i n v c o u n t = None
11 s e l f . d i r e c t l u t s = None
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12 s e l f . d i r e c t l a t e n c y = None
13 s e l f . i n v l u t s = None
14 s e l f . i n v l a t e n c y = None
15 s e l f . t o t a l l u t s = None
16 s e l f . t o t a l l a t e n c y = None
17 s e l f . genChangeBas i sMat ( )
18 s e l f . c o u n t O n e s I n B a s i s ( )
19 s e l f . LUTsInBas i s ( )
20
21 def genChangeBas i sMat ( s e l f ) :
22 c l s t = [ ]
23 c l s t . append ( c rea teOneElem ( s e l f . F ) )
24 c l s t . append ( s e l f . c )
25 f o r i in range ( 2 , g e t c o e f f C o u n t ( s e l f . F ) ) :
26 new c = s e l f . F . g m u l t ( c l s t [ − 1 ] , s e l f . c )
27 c l s t . append ( new c )
28
29 b a s i s m a t = [ ]
30 f o r c in c l s t :
31 # C re a t e a l i s t o f c o e f f i c i e n t s
32 b a s i s m a t . append ( gfElem2Ls t ( s e l f . F , c ) )
33
34 b a s i s t u p l e = l i s t ( z i p (* b a s i s m a t [ : : − 1 ] ) )
35 # Conver t t h e l i s t o f t u p l e s t o a l i s t o f l i s t s
36 s e l f . b a s i s = [ ]
37 f o r row in b a s i s t u p l e :
38 s e l f . b a s i s . append ( l i s t ( row ) )
39 s e l f . i n v b a s i s = g f m a t m o d i n v ( s e l f . p , s e l f . b a s i s )
Due to the limitations of the Galois field library used, the normal basis change of basis
matrices cannot be computed in the same fashion as the polynomial basis versions since the
library is not capable of normal basis arithmetic. Instead the class containing the normal
basis member function genChangeBasisMat inherits from the polynomial basis class. It
uses the parent class implementation to construct the change of basis matrices transform-
ing between the original representation and the composite polynomial representation. The
matrices for conversion between composite polynomial and composite normal are also con-
structed. Using these two sets of matrices, a combined matrix to directly transfer between
the original and composite normal representation can be implemented. Each normal basis
coefficient can be first converted to composite polynomial, and then to the original repre-
sentation. Once done for each coefficient, the new combined inverse matrix is formed. The
direct matrix can then be found through inversion.
Listing 5.4: GFNormCompFieldBasis derived class definition and genChangeBasisMat
member function constructing a normal basis composite field, this inherits from the poly-
nomial basis version
1 c l a s s GFNormCompFieldBasis ( GFCompFieldBasis ) :
2 def i n i t ( s e l f , c , norm , F ) :
3 s e l f . norm = norm
4 super ( GFNormCompFieldBasis , s e l f ) . i n i t ( c , F )
5
6 def genChangeBas i sMat ( s e l f ) :
7 super ( GFNormCompFieldBasis , s e l f ) . genChangeBas i sMat ( )
8 # Get t h e normal b a s i s c o n v e r s i o n m a t r i c e s
9 toNormLst , t o P o l y L s t = g e n B a s i s T a b l e s ( s e l f . F , s e l f . norm )
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11 num coef f = g e t c o e f f C o u n t ( s e l f . F )
12
13 # I n i t i a l i z e c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s
14 c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s = [ ]
15 f o r i in range ( 0 , num coef f ) :
16 c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s . append ( num coef f * [ 0 ] )
17
18 # For each normal c o e f f i c i e n t
19 # 1 . Change b a s i s t o p o l y n o m i a l
20 # 2 . Then a p p l y o r i g i n a l i n v e r s e b a s i s t o go back t o o r i g i n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
21 # 3 . Update c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s w i t h new row
22 f o r i in range ( 0 , num coef f ) :
23 # C re a t e a normal e l e m e n t w i t h one c o e f f i c i e n t e q u a l t o 1
24 norm elem = c r e a t e E l e m ( s e l f . F , b i t f i e l d ( s e l f . p** i , m i n l e n = num coef f ) )
25
26 # Change b a s i s t o p o l y n o m i a l
27 p o l y c o e f f = c h a n g e B a s i s ( s e l f . F . b a s e F i e l d , t o P o l y L s t , g fE lem2Ls t ( s e l f . F ,
↪→ norm elem , f l a t t e n = F a l s e ) )
28 p o l y e l e m = s e l f . F . i p . c l a s s ( p o l y c o e f f )
29
30 # Then a p p l y o r i g i n a l i n v e r s e b a s i s t o go back t o o r i g i n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
31 o r i g c o e f f = c h a n g e B a s i s ( s e l f . p , s e l f . i n v b a s i s , g fE lem2Ls t ( s e l f . F , p o l y e l e m ) )
32 f o r j in range ( num coef f ) :
33 c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s [ j ] [ num coeff − i −1] = o r i g c o e f f [ j ]
34
35 # R e a s s i g n t o i n v b a s i s and b a s i s
36 s e l f . i n v b a s i s = c o m b i n e d i n v b a s i s
37 # Using new b a s i s , compute t h e i n v e r s e
38 s e l f . b a s i s = g f m a t m o d i n v ( s e l f . p , s e l f . i n v b a s i s )
5.2 RTL Generation
The RTL for the composite multiplicative inversion implementations were generated using
Python scripts. The scripts were separated into three components.
1. A wrapper script that contains the chosen field, isomorphism, and normal element
(for normal representations only) that calls functions to generate the RTL.
2. Functions to generate the structural composite modules.
3. Functions to generate the behavioral sub field operations.
5.2.1 Main Wrapper Scripts
The main script for P4P2P2 RTL generation is shown in Appendix A.1. Each of the can-
didates have a script organized in a similar fashion. It is responsible for declaring the field
used for the composite inversion and calling each of the functions generating the RTL.
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5.2.2 Composite RTL Generation Scripts
Since the structure of the composite operations are the same for all PXP2 or PXN2 imple-
mentations, the core functionality was made to be generic. A wrapper function provides the
field, the suffixes for the extension and sub field, and the width of the operands. The main
function then consumes the arguments and writes the RTL to an output file. An example of
this for the composite polynomial basis inversion is shown in Appendix A.2.
5.2.3 Base Field RTL Generation Scripts
Behavioral implementation functions were made for the base field operations as well as
the P4P2 inversion and square-scaling operations. These functions take an argument for
the field and then generates a module with a sum-of-product assignment for each bit of the
output. An example of the script is shown in Listing 5.5 and the auto-generated RTL in
Listing 5.6.
Listing 5.5: Script generating GF (24) inversion RTL
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env p y t ho n
2
3 from c o r e . g a l o i s import *
4 from c o r e . u t i l i t i e s import *
5 from g e n h d l . g e n a s s i g n m e n t import g e n 1 d s o p a s s i g n m e n t
6
7 def g e n 2 4 i n v ( F , o u t f i l e ) :
8 fh = open ( o u t f i l e , ’w’ )
9 fh . w r i t e ( ”””
10 l i b r a r y i e e e ;
11 use i e e e . s t d l o g i c 1 1 6 4 . a l l ;
12
13 e n t i t y i n v 4 i s
14 p o r t (
15 x : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (3 downto 0 ) ;
16 y : o u t s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (3 downto 0 )
17 ) ;
18 end i n v 4 ;
19
20 a r c h i t e c t u r e b e h a v i o r a l o f i n v 4 i s
21 b e g i n
22
23 p r o c e s s ( x )
24 b e g i n \n””” )
25 # C re a t e t a b l e o f i n v e r s e s
26 r e s = [ ]
27 f o r i in range ( 2 * * 4 ) :
28 elem = GFElem ( b i t f i e l d ( i ) )
29 i n v = F . power ( elem , 14)
30 r e s . append ( gfElem2Ls t ( F , i n v ) )
31 # C re a t e t r a n s p o s e t a b l e
32 # Organ i zed Idx0 ( msb ) IdxN ( l s b )
33 r e s t = [ ]
34 f o r i in range (3 , −1 , −1) :
35 r o w t = [ ]
36 f o r j in range ( 2 * * 4 ) :
37 r o w t . append ( r e s [ j ] [ i ] )
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38 r e s t . append ( r o w t )
39
40 # Genera te a s s i g n m e n t s t r i n g and p r i n t l i n e
41 f o r i in range ( 3 , −1 , −1) :
42 a s s i g n s t r =
43 g e n 1 d s o p a s s i g n m e n t ( ” x ” , 4 , ” y ( ” + s t r ( i ) + ” ) ” ,
44 r e s t [ i ] )
45 fh . w r i t e ( ” ” + a s s i g n s t r + ”\n ” )
46
47 fh . w r i t e ( ”””\
48 end p r o c e s s ;
49 end b e h a v i o r a l ; ””” )
Listing 5.6: GF (24) inversion autogenerated RTL
1
2 l i b r a r y i e e e ;
3 use i e e e . s t d l o g i c 1 1 6 4 . a l l ;
4
5 e n t i t y i n v 4 i s
6 port (
7 x : in s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (3 downto 0) ;
8 y : out s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (3 downto 0)
9 ) ;
10 end i n v 4 ;
11
12 a r c h i t e c t u r e b e h a v i o r a l of i n v 4 i s
13 begin
14
15 p r o c e s s ( x )
16 begin
17 y ( 3 ) <= ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and
↪→ ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and
↪→ ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( (
↪→ x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) ;
18 y ( 2 ) <= ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and
↪→ ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and
↪→ ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( (
↪→ x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and (
↪→ not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and (
↪→ not x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) ;
19 y ( 1 ) <= ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and
↪→ ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and
↪→ ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( (
↪→ x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) ;
20 y ( 0 ) <= ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and
↪→ ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and
↪→ ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( not x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( (
↪→ x ( 3 ) ) and ( not x ( 2 ) ) and ( not x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and (
↪→ not x ( 2 ) ) and ( x ( 1 ) ) and ( x ( 0 ) ) ) or ( ( x ( 3 ) ) and ( x ( 2 ) ) and (
↪→ x ( 1 ) ) and ( not x ( 0 ) ) ) ;
21 end p r o c e s s ;





The fields for each of the candidates are listed in Table 6.1. The change of basis matrices
can be found in the Appendix. The GF ((28)2) and GF (((24)2)2) candidates were selected
by the Python scripts. The GF (((((22)2)2)2) candidate which serves as a benchmark is
from Werner’s MK-3 FPGA implementation [11] which uses a composite representation
similar to what is in Wood’s thesis [10].
The field notation usesQ as the uppermost extension field and the subordinate fields use
progressively lower letters. GF ((28)2) representations use P as the base field GF (28), and
Q as the extension field. GF (((24)2)2) representations use O as the base field GF (24), P
as the first extension GF ((24)2) and Q as the upper extension. Likewise, GF ((((22)2)2)2)
uses the letters N , O, P , Q.
The GF (((24)2)2) implementations use w4 + w + 1 for the base field. This is one of
the two possible irreducible polynomials possible to use inside of GF (24).
The GF ((28)2) implementations each use the AES irreducible polynomial for the base
field. This was chosen due to the extensive research on it as a part of Rijndael becoming
the advanced encryption standard.
Additionally, the P8P2 and P8N2 use a secondary basis transformation to convert P8
multiplication to P4P2 multiplication. The base field uses the same irreducible polynomial
as seen in the GF (((24)2)2) implementations, x4 + x+ 1.
P (x) = x4 + x+ 1
Q(y) = y2 + y + {x3}
6.2 Implementation Results
Table 6.2 shows the implementation metrics for each of the S-Box candidates. Each S-





P (x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
Q(y) = y2 + y + {x5}
P8N2 -
P (x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
Q(y) = y2 + y + {x5 + x}
norm = y + {x7 + x6 + x5 + x2 + x}
P4P2P2 Hierarchical
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w2 + w + 1}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3}x}
P4P2N2 Hierarchical
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3 + 1}x+ {w3}}
norm = y + {{w3 + w2 + w + 1}x+ {1}}
P4P2P2 Flattened
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w2 + w + 1}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3 + w2}x+ {w}}
P4P2N2 Flattened
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3 + 1}x+ {w3}}
norm = y + {x+ {w}}
N2N2N2N2 [11] - NAa
Table 6.1: Composite S-Box candidates
aThe RTL used for this implementation was inherited from Werner’s FPGA implementation [11]. The
composite representation beyond being N2N2N2N2 is unknown since the RTL does not contain relevant
comments. Note that this differs from the candidate suggested by Wood which uses a P2P2P2N2 representa-
tion [10] but is functionally identical.
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in order to get timing metrics. The GF ((28)2) and GF (((24)2)2) implementations use
the RTL generated from the scripts. The N2N2N2N2 S-Box was implemented using the
original RTL from Werner’s MK-3 FPGA implementation [11]. Each of the designs were






















































































































































































































































Figure 6.1: Post Place and Route Implementation Metrics
Overall, the two best candidates are the P4P2P2 flattened implementation which has
the smallest area footprint of 271 LUTs and the P4P2N2 flattened implementation which
has the highest clock frequency of 125 MHz. The notable outcome of this is that the
flattened P4P2 inversion and square-scaling implementation had opposite effects on these
two candidates. For P4P2P2, it lowered the number of LUTs used in the design and had no
impact on the clock frequency. For P4P2N2, it only lowered the number of LUTs, but it
increased the clock frequency. The increase in the clock frequency is likely a result of the
P4P2N2 flattened approach having one fewer logic slice.
Some of this can be explained by looking at the change in the number of F7 and F8
MUXs across the hierarchical and flattened implementations of the GF (((24)2)2) candi-
dates. For P4P2P2, the number of F7 multiplexers dropped from 39 to 32 and F8 mul-
tiplexers from 11 to 4. This indicates that 7 signals originally requiring 8 inputs in the
hierarchical approach now only need 7 or fewer inputs. Furthermore, since the number of
F7 MUXs decreased, there are 7 signals that now need 6 or fewer inputs.
For P4P2N2, the flattened approach actually increased the number of F7 and F8 MUXs.
This indicates that the synthesis or place-and-route algorithm found a way to combine more
of the logic inside of a slice. While using more F7 and F8 MUXs can increase the area
utilization, it can increase the locality of the operation; it is now performed inside of a logic
slice. This resulted in a design with a shorter critical path and a faster clock frequency.
The GF ((28)2) candidates are less optimal, and offer no benefit over the N2N2N2N2
baseline implementation. While the P8 inversion and square-scaling is optimal, the cost of
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the extra change of basis matrices to break up the P8 multiplication into P4P2 negatively
affected the resource utilization and the clock frequency was still 90.91 MHz.
The choice of the base field does not directly affect the area utilization. While the
GF ((28)2) implementations have the worst area utilization of all of them, this is a result
of needing the extra change of basis matrices to break up the P8 multiplication into P4P2.
TheGF (((24)2)2) candidates are within 13% of the baseline area utilization and in one case
actually better. The main impact the base field has is in the clock frequency. By increasing
the base field to GF (24), the synthesis tool was able to better pack the logic into slices and
minimize the critical path. The GF ((((22)2)2)2) does not use any F7 or F8 multiplexers,
and nor should it since the RTL was written to perform operations on no more than 4 bits
at a time. Due to this, the implementation heuristics were not able to optimize the design
for clock frequency as well as the GF (((24)2)2) designs. If the GF ((28)2) designs could
have functioned without the extra change of basis matrices, it may have been competitive
with the GF (((24)2)2) designs.
The effect of the outer extension basis had little to no effect on the outcome of the
implementations. While there is some variation seen in the GF (((24)2)2), most of that
seems to be a result of the heuristics used to synthesize the design. This work could be ex-
tended by examining the designs when implementing with an area or frequency optimized
synthesis and place and route heuristics.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The goal of this thesis was to investigate the effect of ASIC S-Box hardware optimizations
on an FPGA. The most dramatic affect on the area and performance on the implementation
was the choice of the base field size. GF (24) had the best clock frequency of the three
options. This was due to the base field operations each being able to fit inside of a single
Logic Slice which minimized the critical path.
The choice of the basis of the outer extension field did not have a meaningful affect on
the implementation results. This is a result of composite inversion requiring the same num-
ber of sub field inversions and multiplication units; changing the basis simply rearranges
the order of the operations.
Finally while the P4P2 flattened approach increased the clock frequency of the P4P2N2
design but lowered the area utilization of the P4P2P2 design when compared to the hier-
archical approach, this is likely due to the heuristics of the synthesis and place and route
algorithms. Further work can be done in the future to explore the implementation strategies
on an FGPA.
7.2 Future Work
There are several areas that this thesis could be expanded upon. Some of these topics arose
as questions during the work of this thesis and others were initially planned for but there
was not sufficient time left to complete.
7.2.1 Implementation Strategies
The first subject would be the implementation strategies used for each of the candidates.
The flattened approach for theGF (((24)2)2) implementations saw considerable variation in
the area utilization and clock frequency. A better understanding could be reached by using
a range of synthesis and place and route heuristics. By doing so, the individual features of
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Figure 7.1: High Level Compensation block diagram [24]
each implementation could be better understood since the heuristics would focus on area
or frequency.
7.2.2 MK-3 Resistance to Power Attacks
This area of research was originally part of the proposal but it was trimmed due to time con-
straints. Differential Power Analysis and Correlation Power Analysis are two techniques
that can be used to discover the key and the plaintext used in encryption by examining vari-
ations in the power consumption of the device and the ciphertext that it produces [22, 23].
There are several approaches that can mitigate this. The first solution called High Level
Compensation seeks to make the power consumption of the encryption device constant.
This is accomplished by sensing the instantaneous power consumption consumed by the
device and consuming the unused portion [24] using an operational amplifier as shown in
Fig. 7.1.
Another approach that yields itself very well to ASICs is Dynamic Differential Logic
(DDL). The principal behind this is to make the power consumption of the device uniform,
but not necessarily constant [25]. The original Single Ended (SE) design is duplicated into
direct and complementary. The output of the complementary component is the inverse
of the original direct component. Therefore, a logic transition in one of the elements is
counteracted by the opposite. Additionally the clock period is split into two phases. The
first phase, pre-charge forces each net to 0. The second phase, evaluation performs the
operation. By combining the differential logic and the split clock phase, every clock cycle
has one logical transition between the differential pairs. In doing so, the power trace is
rendered uniform such that an adversary can not glean any information from it.
DDL can be introduced into an ASIC design where there is a high degree of control
over the individual gates that are rendered for an operation. Special care must be taken
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to implement this on an FPGA where the logic is mapped to LUTs and the DDL results
in a dramatic increase in area utilization. Yu et al [26] found that some DDL techniques
increased the area utilization in an FPGA as much as 11.6 times the SE design.
Much of the prior research on DDL has focused on encryption algorithms such as AES
[25, 27, 28, 29] and hashes such as SHA-3 and the candidate for SHA-3, Keccak [30, 31].
DDL and High Level Compensation could be implemented on MK-3 in order to investigate
the impact in area on a 16-bit S-Box.
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RTL Generation Script Examples
Additional scripts are provided in this chapter to show the structure of the RTL generation.
A.1 P4P2P2 Main Script
The script below is responsible for generating all of the RTL for P4P2P2 inversion. The
script imports all of the necessary modules, declares the field, and then calls the functions
from the imported modules to generate the RTL. The RTL for the other candidates is gen-
erated using the same format.
Listing A.1: Script generating P4P2P2 inversion RTL
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env p y t ho n
2
3 from c o r e . g a l o i s import *
4 from c o r e . u t i l i t i e s import *
5 from c o r e . c o m p f i e l d b a s i s import *
6
7 from g e n h d l . g e n 2 4 m u l import *
8 from g e n h d l . g e n 2 4 i n v import *
9 from g e n h d l . g e n 2 4 s q import *
10 from g e n h d l . g e n 2 4 s c import *
11 from g e n h d l . g e n 2 4 s s import *
12 from g e n h d l . gen po ly comp mul import *
13 from g e n h d l . g e n p o l y c o m p i n v import *
14 from g e n h d l . g e n p o l y c o m p s c import *
15 from g e n h d l . g e n p o l y c o m p s q import *
16 from g e n h d l . g e n p o l y c o m p s s import *
17 from g e n h d l . gen cb import *
18
19 i f n a m e == ” m a i n ” :
20 i f l e n ( s y s . a rgv ) == 2 :
21 p a t h = s y s . a rgv [ 1 ]
22 e l s e :
23 p a t h = ’ o u t p u t h d l / 2 4 ’
24
25 W = GFElem ( [ 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 1 ] ) # wˆ4+w+1
26 X = GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 ] ) , GFElem ( [ 1 ] ) , GFElem ( [ 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ] ) ] ) # x ˆ2+ x+{wˆ3+wˆ2+w
↪→ +1}
27 Y = GFExtensionElem ( [ GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 ] ) ] ) , GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 ] ) ] ) ,
28 GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 ] ) , GFElem ( ) ] ) ] ) # y ˆ+ y +{[wˆ 3 ] x}
29 F gnd = GF( 2 , 4 , W)
30 F mid = GFExtens ion ( F gnd , 2 , X)
60
31 F t o p = GFExtens ion ( F mid , 2 , Y)
32
33 nu x = X[ 0 ]
34 nu y = Y[ 0 ]
35 n u x i n v = F gnd . power (X[ 0 ] , 14)
36 n u y i n v = F mid . power (Y[ 0 ] , 254)
37
38 # C o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e c o m p o s i t e square − s c a l i n g t o be o p t i m i z e d
39 a s s e r t Y [ 0 ] [ 0 ] . i s Z e r o ( )
40 a s s e r t F mid . g add ( n u x i n v ,Y [ 0 ] [ 1 ] ) . i s Z e r o ( )
41
42 c = GFExtensionElem ( [ GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 , 0 , 0 ] ) , GFElem ( ) ] ) ,
43 GFExtensionElem ( [ GFElem ( [ 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 ] ) , GFElem ( [ 1 , 1 , 0 , 1 ] ) ] ) ] )
44 # C: [ [ ( 1wˆ 2 ) x ˆ 1 ] y ˆ1 + [ ( 1wˆ3 + 1wˆ 0 ) x ˆ1 + (1wˆ3 + 1wˆ2 + 1wˆ 0 ) x ˆ 0 ] y ˆ 0 ]
45
46 b a s i s = GFCompFieldBasis ( c , F t o p )
47
48 # Base f i e l d o p e r a t i o n s
49 g e n 2 4 m u l ( F gnd , p a t h + ” / mul 4 . vhd ” )
50 g e n 2 4 i n v ( F gnd , p a t h + ” / i n v 4 . vhd ” )
51 g e n 2 4 s q ( F gnd , p a t h + ” / s q 4 . vhd ” )
52 g e n 2 4 s c ( F gnd , nu x , p a t h + ” / s c 4 . vhd ” )
53 g e n 2 4 s c ( F gnd , n u x i n v , p a t h + ” / s c n u i n v 4 . vhd ” , ” s c n u i n v 4 ” )
54 g e n 2 4 s s ( F gnd , nu x , p a t h + ” / s s 4 . vhd ” )
55
56 # GF ( ( 2 ˆ 4 ) ˆ 2 ) c o m p o s i t e o p e r a t i o n s
57 g e n 2 4 2 m u l ( F mid , p a t h + ” / m u l p o l y 4 2 . vhd ” )
58 g e n 2 4 2 i n v ( F mid , p a t h + ” / i n v p o l y 4 2 . vhd ” )
59 g e n 2 4 2 s c ( F mid , p a t h + ” / s c p o l y 4 2 . vhd ” )
60 g e n 2 4 2 s q ( F mid , p a t h + ” / s q p o l y 4 2 . vhd ” )
61 g e n 2 4 2 s s ( F mid , p a t h + ” / s s p o l y 4 2 . vhd ” )
62
63 # GF ( ( ( 2 ˆ 4 ) ˆ 2 ) ˆ 2 ) c o m p o s i t e o p e r a t i o n s
64 g e n 2 4 2 2 p o l y m u l ( F top , p a t h + ” / m u l p o l y 4 2 2 . vhd ” )
65 g e n 2 4 2 2 p o l y i n v ( F top , p a t h + ” / i n v p o l y 4 2 2 . vhd ” )
66
67 # Change o f b a s i s
68 g e n p l a i n t o c o m p ( b a s i s , p a t h + ” / p2c 16 . vhd ” )
69 g e n c o m p t o p l a i n ( b a s i s , p a t h + ” / c2p 16 . vhd ” )
A.2 Polynomial, Composite Wrapper Generation
The main function of this script gen poly comp inv is written generically to handle any
size binary extension field. The end of the script features helper functions that supply the
arguments necessary to perform P4P2, P4P2P2, and P8P2 inversion. The other composite
wrappers are written in the same fashion.
Listing A.2: Script generating structural composite inversion RTL
1 # ! / u s r / b i n / env p y t ho n
2
3 from c o r e . g a l o i s import *
4 from c o r e . u t i l i t i e s import *
5
6 def g e n p o l y c o m p i n v ( F , e n t s t r , s u b s t r , width , o u t f i l e ) :
7 fh = open ( o u t f i l e , ’w’ )
61
8
9 s u b w i d t h = wid th / 2
10
11 fh . w r i t e ( ”””
12 l i b r a r y i e e e ;
13 use i e e e . s t d l o g i c 1 1 6 4 . a l l ;
14
15 e n t i t y i n v %s i s
16 p o r t (
17 x : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ;
18 y : o u t s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 )
19 ) ;
20 end i n v %s ;
21
22 a r c h i t e c t u r e b e h a v i o r a l o f i n v %s i s
23 s i g n a l d e l t a 1 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− Upper component o f d i r e c t
24 s i g n a l d e l t a 2 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− Lower component o f d i r e c t
25 s i g n a l d e l t a 3 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− Upper component o f i n v e r s e
26 s i g n a l d e l t a 4 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− Outer component o f i n v e r s e
27 s i g n a l s s : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− d e l t a 1 squared * nu
28 s i g n a l add 1 2 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− d e l t a 1 + d e l t a 2
29 s i g n a l mu l 1 2 : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− add 1 2 * d e l t a 2
30 s i g n a l i n v i n : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− mul 1 2 + s s ( i n p u t t o t h e i n v e r t e r )
31 s i g n a l i n v o u t : s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ; −− o u t p u t o f GF( 2 ˆ 4 ) i n v e r t e r
32
33 ””” % ( e n t s t r , width −1 , width −1 , e n t s t r , e n t s t r , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 ,
34 sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 ,
35 sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1) )
36
37 fh . w r i t e ( ”””
38 component mul %s i s
39 p o r t (
40 x : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ;
41 y : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ;
42 z : o u t s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 )
43 ) ;
44 end component ;
45
46 component i n v %s i s
47 p o r t (
48 x : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ;
49 y : o u t s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 )
50 ) ;
51 end component ;
52
53 component s s %s i s
54 p o r t (
55 x : i n s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 ) ;
56 y : o u t s t d l o g i c v e c t o r (%d downto 0 )
57 ) ;
58 end component ;
59
60 b e g i n
61
62 ””” % ( s u b s t r , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 ,
63 s u b s t r , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1 ,
64 s u b s t r , sub wid th −1 , sub wid th −1) )
65
66 fh . w r i t e ( ”””
67 d e l t a 1 <= x(%d downto %d ) ;
68 d e l t a 2 <= x(%d downto 0 ) ;
62
69
70 add 1 2 <= d e l t a 1 xor d e l t a 2 ;
71
72 mul 1 2 comp : mul %s
73 p o r t map (
74 x => add 1 2 ,
75 y => d e l t a 2 ,
76 z => mul 1 2
77 ) ;
78
79 ss comp : s s %s
80 p o r t map (
81 x => d e l t a 1 ,
82 y => s s
83 ) ;
84
85 i n v i n <= mul 1 2 xor s s ;
86
87 i n v o u t c o m p : i n v %s
88 p o r t map (
89 x => i n v i n ,
90 y => i n v o u t
91 ) ;
92
93 d e l t a 3 c o m p : mul %s
94 p o r t map (
95 x => d e l t a 1 ,
96 y => i n v o u t ,
97 z => d e l t a 3
98 ) ;
99
100 d e l t a 4 c o m p : mul %s
101 p o r t map (
102 x => i n v o u t ,
103 y => add 1 2 ,
104 z => d e l t a 4
105 ) ;
106
107 y <= d e l t a 3 & d e l t a 4 ;
108
109 end b e h a v i o r a l ; ””” % ( width −1 , sub wid th , sub wid th −1 , s u b s t r , s u b s t r ,
110 s u b s t r , s u b s t r , s u b s t r ) )
111
112 def g e n 2 4 2 i n v ( F , o u t f i l e ) :
113 g e n p o l y c o m p i n v ( F , ” 4 2 ” , ” 4 ” , 8 , o u t f i l e )
114
115 def g e n 2 4 2 2 p o l y i n v ( F , o u t f i l e ) :
116 g e n p o l y c o m p i n v ( F , ” 4 2 2 ” , ” 4 2 ” , 16 , o u t f i l e )
117
118 def g e n 2 8 2 p o l y i n v ( F , o u t f i l e ) :




The fields for the candidates are listed below:
B.1 P8P2
P (x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
Q(y) = y2 + y + {x5}
M =

0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0





1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1

B.2 P8N2
P (x) = x8 + x4 + x3 + x+ 1
Q(y) = y2 + y + {x5 + x}




1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0




1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1

B.3 P4P2 for composite P8 multiplication
P (x) = x4 + x+ 1




1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0




1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

B.4 P4P2P2 with hierarchical P4P2 operations
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w2 + w + 1}




1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0




0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1

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B.5 P4P2N2 with hierarchical P4P2 operations
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3 + 1}x+ {w3}}
normal = y1 + {{w3 + w2 + w + 1}x+ 1}
M =

0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0





1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0

B.6 P4P2P2 with combined P4P2 operations
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w2 + w + 1}




1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0




0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1

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B.7 P4P2N2 with combined P4P2 operations
O(w) = w4 + w + 1
P (x) = x2 + x+ {w3 + w}
Q(y) = y2 + y + {{w3 + 1}x+ {w3}}
normal = y1 + {x+ {w}}
M =

1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0





1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1

